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A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 
A. BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; 
G. W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D. 
BANKS, and all unknown oersons 
who claim any interest in the 
subject matter of this action, 
Defendants. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA. 
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife, Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a cor 
poration; and SECURITY 
TITLE COMPANY, a corpor 
ation, Third Party 
Defendants. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 




SUMMIT COUNTY and PARK CITY, 





J. Re k-fc-.i \ L i „ - „£ 
Case No. 14505 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Summit County, Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark & Marsh 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Sireet 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert W. Adkins 
Summit County Attorney, 
Summit County Courthouse 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
y s Plaintiff, 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 
A. BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; 
G. W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D. 
BANKS, and all unknown oersons 
who claim any interest in the 
subject matter of this action, 
Defendants. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA. 
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife, Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a cor 
poration; and SECURITY 
TITLE COMPANY, a corpor 
ation, Third Party 
Defendants. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 




SUMMIT COUNTY and PARK CITY, 
a municipal Corporation, Third Party 
Defendant -
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant reaffirms its statement of facts in its initial brief and makes the following 
statements regarding respondents' statement of facts. The respondents assert that "the 
references on Page 2 [of appellant's brief] to the deeds to and from Security Title Company 
are irrelevant and do not accurately state where the description in those deeds came from." 
(Respondents' Brief, P. 4.) The attorney for the respondent apparently did not believe those 
Heeds to be irrelevant when he offered Exhibit 11B, which contained those deeds to and 
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from Security Title Company, at the trial. The deeds to and from Security Title Company 
are relevant because they contain a substantially different description than is contained in 
either the Butkovichs' answer, counterclaim, third party complaint, or decree quieting title. 
The differences between the deeds to and from Security Title and the different description 
contained in all of the Butkovich pleadings, was never explained either to the lower court or 
in the respondents' brief. The respondents allege that the appellant did not ''accurately state 
where the description on" the deeds to and from Security Title came from. That inaccuracy 
was caused by Mr. Butkovich, because he testified that the description was prepared by Mr. 
Raymond L. Griffith (Tr. 68), but Mr. Griffith denied that he had prepared or given it to 
Mr. butkovich (Tr. 109). The inaccuracy created by Mr. Butkovich was glossed over, but 
never clarified nor explained, in the respondents' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
The Butkovichs argue in their brief that Summit County has no right to challenge their 
title. In reply to those issues Summit County will respond to those points. 
POINT I 
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS 
OWN DEED AND DENYING THE TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHS. 
In support of its argument that the County is estopped from challenging its deed, the 
Butkovichs cite the case of Daniell vs. Sherril, 48 So. 2d 736, 23 ALR 2d 1410 (1950), a 
decision from the State of Florida. It is interesting to note that the Butkovichs did not cite 
any Utah authority on this point, apparently because there is none that supports their 
position. In fact, the Utah law in this regard is clearly contrary to the position taken by the 
Butkovichs. The Court in Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P2d 965, 968 
(1947), clearly established that a county is not estopped from challenging the validity of its 
own tax deed simply because the county was the grantor. The Court said: 
Plaintiff also contends in support of his demurrer, that the defendants' 
answer alleges facts which estop Carbon County from denying the validity of 
plaintiff's tax deed, and that defendants stand in no better position than Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Carbon County, their grantor. Assumming for the purpose of this argument 
only, that the county could be estopped in a case like this, we find nothing 
in the answer from which it could be inferred that the county made any represen-
tations whatsoever, or that plaintiff relied upon any representations of the 
county in purchasing the tax deed. On the contrary, it is a well recognized 
principle that counties do not warrant tax titles. Purchasers of tax titles, take 
subject to the previous owner's right of redemption and to any defects or infirmi-
ties in the procedure through which the county acquired its interest. There is 
nothing in defendants' answer from which an estoppel against the county, or its 
successors in interest can be inferred. 
Daniell vs. Sherill, supra, while it may be applicable in Florida, is clearly not good law 
in Utah. This matter is controlled by this Court's decision in Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, 
supra, and Summit County is not estopped from challenging the deeds to the Butkovichs. 
There is nothing in the record indicating that Summit County made any representations 
whatsoever to the Butkovichs regarding the property. It should be remembered that Mr. 
Butkovich researched the tax records prior to making the offer to Summit County for the 
tax deeds, and it was Mr. Butkovich who came up with the description contained in the tax 
deeds (Tr. 67). Summit County made no representations to Mr. Butkovich when he 
purchased the tax deeds at the private sale, and, therefore, Summit County is not estopped 
from challenging the deeds issued to the Butkovichs. 
POINT II 
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT BARRED BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
FROM CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHS. 
The Butkovichs argue that the County is equitably estopped from challenging the title 
of the Butkovichs because of its levy, assessment, and collection of taxes for previous years 
and because of Summit County's failure to refund or offer to refund the taxes collected on 
the property. In support of its argument, the Butkovichs cite only the decision in Daniell vs. 
Sheril, supra, which, as previously pointed out, is not good law in Utah. Certainly the 
assessment and collection of taxes does not bar the County (or any other claimant) from 
claiming title to the property. The Butkovichs in their argument have ignored the applicable 
Utah statutes regarding the repayment of the purchase price of an invalid tax title and the 
taxes paid by the purchaser for subsequent years. Section 59-10-65, U.C.A., provides: 
Every person who has purchased or shall hereafter purchase any invalid 
tax title to any real property in this state shall from the effective date of this Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
act have a lein against such property for the recovery of the amount of the 
purchase price paid to the county therefor to the extent that the county would 
have a lien prior to the sale by the county, but in no event shall the lien be 
greater than the amount of taxes, interest, and penalties, or the amount 
actually paid whichever is smaller; provided however, taxes paid by the 
purchaser for subsequent years after the purchase from the county shall be 
included in the amount secured by said lien, which has not already been re-
covered. Such lien shall have the same priority against such property as the 
lien for the delinquent taxes which were liquidated by such purchase except 
that it shall not have preference over any right, title or interest in or lien 
against such property acquired since the purchase of such tax title and prior 
to the effective date of this section for value and without notice and such lien 
shall bear interest at the legal rate for a period of not to exceed four years. 
Such lien shall be foreclosed in any action wherein the invalidity of such tax 
title is determined. If such lien is not foreclosed at the time of the determina-
tion of the invalidity of such tax title, any later action to foreclose such lien 
shall be forever barred, provided that where such determination was made 
prior to the effective date of this section such action may be commenced at 
any time within one year after such effective date. 
This Court in Farrer vs. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954), interpreted 
Section 59-10-65. In that case, this Court held that the plaintiffs, the losing parties, were 
entitled to a tax lien pursuant to Section 59-10-65, U.C.A., and for closure thereof for the 
- amount actually paid for the tax deeds, plus subsequent general taxes paid and interest at 
the legal rate for the statutory period. In the present case, the Butkovichs would be entitled 
to a refund and forclosure of the taxes paid, if the decision of the lower court is reversed. 
Under Utah law, Summit County does not have to refund or offer to refund the taxes 
collected. Summit County will do equity in this cae, i.e. refund the taxes, if the decision is 
reversed. This is the procedure clearly established by Section 59-10-65, U.C.A. 
This Court many years ago determined that in a suit to quiet title that a plaintiff need 
not offer in the complaint to repay the taxes or other advances made by the defendants. 
Burton vs. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P.2d 652 (1937). 
POINT III 
THE INTEREST OF SUMMIT COUNTY WAS NEVER CONVEYED 
TO THE BUTKOVICHS. 
The Butkovichs inaccurately assert that the only reference to Summit County being the 
owner of the property in this Court's decsion in Colman vs. Butkovich, 538 P.2d 188 (1975) Digit zed by the Howard W. Hunter Law L brary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was ''after the tax deeds to the County * * * and prior to the conveyance of the title by the 
County to the Butkovichs in 1964. * * * There is no holding anywhere in that opinion that 
Summit County now holds title." That assertion by the Butkovichs is totally inaccurate. 
This Court at 538 P.2d 189 held: "The litigation here, under such circumstances, hardly 
could prevail where Summit County, the owner, was not named a party here." The 
litigation was initiated by Colman against Banks approximately seven yers after the tax 
deeds from Summit County. If Summit County's interest in the property had been 
extinguished by the tax deeds to the Butkovichs, as alleged by the Butkovichs, this Court 
surely would have not used the quoted language. The only interpretation that can 
reasonably be drawn from the quoted language is that the quiet title action between Colman 
and the Butkovichs could not result in a decree quieting title for either party, because the 
owner, Summit County, was not a party to the litigation. That interpretation is completely 
consistent with what this Court did in its direction to the trial court simply to dismiss the 
complaint, and it did not order any affirmative relief for the Butkovichs. 
The doctrine of after acquired title, as asserted by the Butkovichs, is not applicable in 
this instance. Rather than being a situation of after acquired title, the facts of the case 
clearly indicate that the deed of Summit County to "all land west of this block" conveyed 
nothing to the defendant. It is not a case of the County conveying title to the property it did 
not have, and then subsequently acquiring title to it. In this sitution the County obtained 
title at the original tax sale to Summit County, and never transferred title to the Butkovichs. 
The title to the property involved has been in the County for forty years. 
Even assuming that this were a situation of after acquired title, that doctrine does not 
apply to tax deeds from the County. The Butkovichs again rely on Daniell vs. Sherril, 
supra, which while it may be good law in Florida, is clearly contrary to the law of Utah. In 
Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, supra, this Court clearly held that the doctrine of after acquired 
title does not apply to tax deeds from the County. This Court at 186 P.2d 968 held: 
Plaintiff next contends that the answer shows title to the land in plaintiff 
by operation of the doctrine of after acquired title. It is plaintiffs contention 
that if the county acquired any interest in the land in question under the 
bankruptcy proceedings, such after-acquired title passed immediately to the 
plaintiff. The contention also is without merit. The deed from the county to 
5 
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plaintiff, was a quitclaim deed. A quitclaim deed does not convey and after-
acquired title. 7 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Ed., Sees. 3845, 
3846, pp. 310-312; 4 Tiffany Real Property, 3d Ed., Sec. 1231, p. 642. 
The title to the property has been, and remains in Summit County. The Butkovichs 
acquired nothing by the tax deed from Summit County, and the doctrine of after acquired 
title is inapplicable. 
POINT IV 
THE FACT THAT THE AUDITOR'S AFFIDAVITS WERE NOT 
ATTACHED TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL WAS ARGUED BEFORE 
THE LOWER COURT. 
The respondents allege that the County did not raise in the lower court the fact that the 
auditor's affidavits were not attached to the assessment roll with respect to the property 
here involved. The respondents allege that "this is the first time in this case that this 
assertion has been made. It was not brought to the attention of the lower court. It appeared 
nowhere in the record of this case." This was presented to the lower court. However, it does 
not appear in the record, because the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was not 
reported. The County attempted to order a transcript of the hearing but could not do so 
because the hearing and the arguments of counsel were not recorded. 
The responsibility for the failure of this to appear of record is solely that of the counsel 
for the County. Having only been involved in this case for a few weeks prior to the hearing, 
counsel mistakenly believed that Exhibit 11 A, the Abstract of Title prepared by Western 
States Title Insurance Company for the Butkovichs was the same Abstract of Title which 
counsel for the plaintiff Colman has given to the County, and which had been prepared by 
Security Title Company. The Abstract of Title prepared by the Security Title Company on 
the property involved included the lack of the required auditor's affidavits on file, while the 
abstract prepared for the Butkovichs did not. Counsel for the County did not discover this 
error until he was preparing his brief on appeal. The lack of the auditor's affidavit was 
argued by counsel before the lower court, and is not raised for the first time on appeal, as 
alleged by the Butkovichs. Since this issue was presented and argued before the lower court, 
it should be considered by this Court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT V 
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FROM MAINTAINING THIS ACTION TO RECOV-
ER THE PROPERTY. 
The respondents allege that Summit County is barred by the Statute of Limitations in 
Section 78-12-5.1 and 5.2, U.C.A. The respondents maintain that these sections bar any 
action or defense against the holder of a tax title unless the party bringing the action or 
asserting the defense has had possession of the property within four years of such action. 
The various statutes dealing with limitations of actions and with adverse possession 
have been subject to a number of legislative enactments and to a considerable number of 
decisions by the Court in recent years. These amendments, together with the other pertinent 
sections of the Code, are now numbered as Sections 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 9, 12, and 
12.1 of Chapter 12, Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Under those statutes the holder of a tax title cannot claim absolute ownership to the 
real property based solely upon holding the tax title for four years after purchase from the 
County. The sections above referred to must be read together, and they specify the elements 
of adverse possession and that the holding of a tax title for four years after purchase from 
the County is only one of those elements. 
The Butkovichs have not fenced, cultivated, or occupied the land (a hillside in the Park 
City area) (Tr. 115). 
This Courin in Lyman vs. National Mortgage Bond Corporation, 320 P.2d 322, 7 Utah 
2d 123 (1958), thoroughly interpreted Section 78-12-5.1 and 5.2, U.C.A. 1953. In that case 
the plaintiffs had secured a tax deed from the county in 1941 and had since been in actual 
possession, had cultivated the property and improved and fenced it. However, they failed to 
show payment of taxes for four consecutive years even though the evidence was clear that 
those taxes not paid were subsequently redeemed. However, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs did not bring themselves within the statute, and the holding of that case is 
controlling in the case at bar: 
"In Bowen v Olson, decided in 1953 under Section 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953, 
prior to the 1951 amendment, we held that a redemption from a delinquent 
tax assessed against this property claimed by adverse possesion under a tax 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sale did not constitute a payment of taxes levied and assessed upon such 
property within the meaning of that statute. After a careful consideration we 
adopted the majority rule on that question and we are not now inclined to 
overrule that decision but adhere thereto. The facts in that case are not dis-
tinguishable from the facts in this case. 
"Plaintiffs contend that a different result is rquired by the 1951 amend-
ments to Section 104-2-5, U.C.A. 1943, which is the same as 78-12-5.1, Pocket. 
Supplement to Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953, and Section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah 
for 1951, which is the same as Section 78-12-5.2, Pocket Supplement to 
Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. In plaintiffs brief these sections are referred to as 
statutes of limitation as distinguished from the other sections previously 
cited above, which are referred to as adverse possession statutes. Hereinafter, 
these designations will be used to distinguish the two sets of statutes. 
'These sections forbid the commencement or maintenance of an action 
or defense claiming ownership or right of possession to real property, unless 
the claimant was seized, possessed or occupied such property within seven 
years prior to the commencement of such action. Where the adverse party, 
in such action, claims under a tax title the limitations period is shortened to 
require seizure, possession or occupation within four years after the creation 
of the tax title claim. These statutes are different from the adverse possession 
statutes considered above in that they contain no requirement that the adverse 
party to the claimant in such action must have had adverse possession and paid 
all taxes assessed against such property during the limitations period. In fact, 
the limitation statutes make no mention of any rights which the adverse party 
must have in order to invoke the provisions of these limitation statutes,, 
"A very strict construction of these statutes might require a holding in 
plaintiff's favor even though they have failed to show payment of the taxes for 
the period required by the adverse possession statutes, for it is clear that none 
of the defendants have actually occupied or been in possession of the property 
within the prescribed limitations period. However, plaintiff's can prevail only 
if we hold that defendants' claims are barred under these limitations statues 
by their failure to occupy or be in possession of the property within the 
prescribed period, regardless of whether plaintiffs have proved a valid claim 
to this property. Such a holding would leave the plaintiffs in possession although 
they have failed to establish any valid claim to such property under the adverse 
possession statutes previously discussed on which their claims are based or by any 
other means. 
4
'We do not think that such construction of these statues was intended. 
Plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own claim and not alone on the 
weakness of the defendants' claims in order to succeed. The mere failure of the 
defendants to show that they have actually occupied or been in possession 
of this property is not sufficient to bar their rights to recover the property 
where, as here, plaintiffs have failed to establish any valid claim or right to the 
property in themselves. These limitation statutes, although they do not 
expressly so provide, only bar the right of a party to maintain an action to 
recover real property where the opposing party established a right of possession 
or ownership in the property. This plaintiffs have failed to do, so the 
decision must be reversed." 
ft 
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CONCLUSION 
The Butkovichs do not have and have not proven any title to the real property here 
involved. The tax deeds were fatally defective as to this property, and no portion of this 
property was conveyed to the respondents. The Butkovichs have made a brazen attempt to 
acquire ground to which they have no title, and is in fact owned and occupied by other 
persons not joined in this action and who reside on the property. This Court has already 
determined in the earlier proceedings that Summit County was the real owner of the 
property. Unless the principals of res judicata and stare decises are dead, the decree quieting 
title in the Butkovichs should be reversed and title to the property should be quieted in 
Summit County. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert W. Adkins 
Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
9 
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